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Most economic models of the household assume that it may be treated as if all members share the same 
preferences or one member (a dictator) makes all resource allocation decision. That assumption is tested 
by asking whether income in the hands of men has the same impact on household commodity demand 
as income in the hands of women. Drawing on budget data from Brazil, we find that the distribution of 
income among men and women within the household does affect demand patterns and this is true for 
both non-labor income as well as total income. Income in the hands of women, relative to men, is 
associated with a larger increase in the share of the household budget devoted to human capital 
(household services, health and education) and also leisure (recreation and ceremonies) goods. The 
proportion of the budget spent on food declines more if the income is in the hands of women although 
food composition also changes and nutrient intakes rise faster as womens' income increases. When the 
sample is restricted to only those couples in which both have some income, however, there is little 
evidence that income in the hands of men and women have significantly different effects on commodity 
consumption. 
KEY WORDS: Intra-household, consumption 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last two or three decades, a good deal of intellectual effort has been devoted to the study of 
household consumption behavior and much has been learnt in both developed and developing countries. In this 
literature, rather little attention has been paid to economic decision-making within the household although there 
has recently been a resurgence of interest in the modelling of intra-household decision-making, at least from 
a theoretical point of view (see Chiappari, 1988a, 1988b, 1992a, 1992b; McElroy and Horney, 1988; McElroy, 
1990). Empirical testing of these models, however, lags far behind. 
This paper attempts to delve into the black box of the household and test the hypothesis that households 
may be treated as if they pool all their income. This may be interpreted as a test for altruism in the household, 
a test for common preferences of all individuals or a test of the dictatorial model of household decision making. 
Essentially, we are testing whether a representative agent model is an adequate description of the household in 
the context of consumer demand analysis. A series of commodity demand functions are estimated which permit 
income effects to vary depending on the individual to whom the income is attributed. We test whether income 
in the hands of men has the same impar.t on r.ommodity demand as income in the hands of women. While the 
aim of the paper is modest, it strikes us as useful exercise to test this simple hypothesis since even this task 
presents several empirical problems. The work may be viewed, then, as a precursor to testing alternative models 
of household resource allocation. Rejection of equality of income effects tells us nothing about the appropriate 
model and we cannot distinguish among the various models that have recently been proposed in the literature. 
For recent studies taking a more structural approach that test specific alternatives, see Bourguignon, Browning, 
Chiappari and Lechene (1991, 1992). 
In the first set of tests presented below, we compare the effects on commodity demand of non-labor 
income in the hands of men and women. Non-labor income, however, accounts for only a fraction of the 
resources available to a household for consumption; thus we also examine the effects of total (non-labor and 
labor) income on household consumption patterns. Since leisure and commodity demand should be treated as 
jointly determined, it is inappropriate to assume labor income is exogenous in this model. Households are 
assumed to make consumption choices in a static one-period model and therefore it is maintained that individual 
non-labor income is exogenous in which case it is a valid instrument for total income. The second set of tests 
examine the impact of total income (treated as endogenous) on household demand. We experiment with 
identification assumptions and restrict the impact on demand of the education of men and women in the 
household to work entirely through income. 
The empirical results, based on a large budget survey from Brazil, indicate that the common preference 
(or income pooling) model is rejected: for several (but not all) commodity groups, the effect of additional income 
in the hands of women is significantly different from the effect of additional money attributed to men. This is 
true for both non-labor income and (instrumented) total income. For example, an additional crusado in the 
hands of a woman will raise the share of the household budget spent on human capital goods ( education, health 
and household services) by about four times more than if the additional income is in the hands of a man. 
Similar patterns emerge for budget shares spent on leisure (recreation and ceremonies). Food shares, and the 
share of the budget spent on meals away from home, are significantly lower if more income is in the hands of 
women than men. In contrast, however, the income of women is associated with higher per capita calorie and 
protein intake by household members and these income effects are significantly larger than those for men. Thus, 
although household food shares decline as women's income rises, the calorie and protein content of food rises. 
All these results are consistent with other evidence, based on the same data, that indicates resources in the hands 
of women have a bigger impact on the health of their children than resources in the hands of men. For some 
goods, the distribution of income within the household has no impact on expenditure shares and this tends to 
be true for goods that might be thought of as being largely 'public' to the household, such as housing and 
household goods as well as, perhaps, clothing. 
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2. MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR 
We begin with a simple static model of household behavior in which household welfare in any period, 
W, depends on the utility of each household member, m = I, ... , M. In turn, each individual's utility function, 
Um, depends on the commodity consumption of all household members, Xim, i= I, ... , G, goods. Utility will also 
depend on the consumption of leisure by each individual in the household, e,, ... eM. A set of individual and 
household specific characteristics, µ, may affect tastes and therefore utility, Um(X, e; µ). 
If a member, n say, is completely selfish, or has egotistical preferences (Chiappori, 1988a), then all 
elements of Xim and em, m=,fn will have weight zero in that member's utility function. In general, however, we 
expect household members to value the consumption of other members in the same household (Becker, 198 I) 
and, indeed, there is some evidence for altruism even beyond the immediate family (Altonji, Hayami and 
Kotlikoff, 1989; Udry, 1990). 
The household welfare function is akin to a Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function and aggregates 
the individual felicity functions: 
w;;:; w [ Ui(X, £; µ)l ... UM(X, e; µ) ] [I] 
which is maximized subject to the household budget constraint: 
p X = Lm [ Wm (T - em) + Ym] [2] 
where the vector p is the set of prices of all goods in X; we assume all household members face parametric 
commodity prices. The price of time for each individual is wm, and so that individual's total income is given by 
the value of earned income wm(T - em) together with non-labor income, Ym• Household income is simply the 
sum of all individuals' incomes. 
Apart from leisure, however, individual consumption is seldom observed in household budget surveys 
(but see, for example, Haddad and Kanbur, 1990, for an exception from the Philippines which attempted to 
measure individual nutrient intake). Instead, budget surveys report total household consumption of each good 
i, ~=EmXim, and, for these goods, it is difficult to assign consumption to each individual without resorting to 
inherently untestable assumptions (Pollak and Wales, 1979; Deaton et al. 1989). Solving the maximization 
problem [ I ]-[2], there is a household demand for commodity i: 
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[3] 
which depends on all prices, p, household characteristics, µ, and individual non-labor incomes, y1, ... , YM· 
The simplest static model of the household assumes either that one member dictates all allocation 
decisions in which case the aggregator function W(.) assigns a zero weight to all but that member's utility 
function. In this case, the demand functions depend not on individual non-labor incomes, but their sum: 
[4] 
Clearly, if all members have the same preferences, or they are altruistic, 1 then household demand will depend 
on total household non-labor income; the (perfect) altruism, common preferences and dictatorial models are, 
therefore, observationally equivalent, at least in terms of their predictions for the impact of individual income 
on household commodity demand. 
The vast majority of studies of consumer demand have imposed this assumption of common preferences 
(see Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Deaton, 1986; Blundell, 1988 for reviews of the literature) and it is a key 
assumption in Becker's ( 1981) discussion of household formation. There has, however, recently been a 
resurgence of interest in the theoretical literature in the modelling of intra-household decision-making which 
emphasizes the role of the individual. 
Over the last decade,, several models of labor supply behavior based on bargaining within the household 
have been suggested; these models rely on some notion of bargaining equilibrium with Nash being by far the 
most common. (See Manser and Brown, 1980; McElroy and Horney, 1981, 1990; Horney and McElroy, 1988; 
Bjorn and Vuong, 1984, 1985 for the co-operative case. The non-cooperative case is presented in Ashworth 
and Ulph, 1981; Bourguignon, 1984 and Ulph, 1988). Other investigations have considered Kalai-Smorodinsky 
(Manser and Brown, 1980) and Stackelberg (Bjorn and Vuong, 1984, 1985) notions of equilibria. Assuming 
Nash equilibrium, then the household members maximize the product of the difference between a member's 
utility and the threat"-point utility, v: which depends on prices, non-labor income arid, possibly, other 
characteristics of household members, P,, (which may differ from those characteristics which condition the utility 
function): 
1If only some members of the household are altruistic, then the preferences of the altruist(s) must dominate: in 
essence, he or she must behave as a dictator. (Manser and Brown, 1980). 
4 
n~=I [ um ( X, £; µ ) - vi;: ( p, Ym; j1, ) ] [5] 
The model implies that household commodity demand will depend on prices, non-labor income and household 
characteristics, µ*, the union ofµ andµ,: 
[6] 
It is, however, not entirely clear how to define threat-point utility: it may be the utility associated with the non­
cooperative outcome (Ulph, 1988; Lundberg and Pollak, 1991) or the utility attained if a member quits the 
household (McElroy, I 990). In the case of the latter, then it is not non-labor income a member receives while 
a member of the household that affects commodity demand but the income the individual would receive if 
outside the household. Current non-labor income would be an error-ridden proxy for the latter. 
While these models have a good deal of intuitive appeal, Chiappari ( 1988a, 1988b, 1992a, 1992b) has 
made the important point that they impose structure on the intra-household allocation process and it is very 
difficult to test this structure. Clearly failure to reject a bargaining model of household resource allocation does 
not imply acceptance of the common preference class of models. See also Apps ( 1982) and the discussion in 
Kooreman and Kapteyn (1990). 
Chiappari (I 988a, 1992a) discusses household resource allocation in a broader framework, assuming 
only that allocations are Pareto-efficient. Chiappari (1988a) presents a series of testable parametric and non­
parametric restrictions imposed on a demand system under the assumption of common preferences as opposed 
to Pareto efficiency. Chiappari ( I 992a) demonstrates that Pareto efficiency implies, and is implied by, the 
existence of an income sharing rule. Assuming further that one's own consumption is weakly separable from 
that of other household members, he discusses in detail the case in which there are goods that can be assigned 
to an individual in the household and demonstrates that it is possible to deduce the income sharing rule, up to 
a constant factor, from the observed demands for those goods. Apart from leisure demand, however, it is 
necessary to make an identifying assumption in order to assign commodity consumption to one member or group 
of members within the household. Using data from Canada (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappari and Lechene, 
1992) and France (Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappari and Lechene, 1991) the empirical implications of this 
model have been investigated under the assumption that male and female adult clothing (among other goods) 
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may be treated as assignable goods. Their evidence is apparently consistent with an individual-based model 
of the household and rejects the model of common preferences. 
The important point for this paper is that even in the absence of assignable goods, Pareto-efficiency 
(or an income sharing rule) implies that household commodity demands depend not on total non-labor income 
but on its distribution within the household: 
[7] 
According to the common preference (altruism or dictatorial) model [4], however, re-arranging the distribution 
of non-labor income within the household will have no impact on household commodity demands. This is a 
key prediction of the common preference model, not shared by any of the more general models; it suggests, 
therefore, a very simple test of the common preference model against a fairly broad class of alternatives, 
including the bargaining type models and the models proposed by Chiappori and collaborators. Maintaining that 
non-labor income is exogenous, we will test whether non-labor income attributed to a man in the household 
has the same impact on commodity demands as non-labor income attributed to a woman in the household. 
Typically non-labor income represents only a small fraction of total resources available to a household 
for consumption. We turn, therefore, to examine the impact on commodity demand of the total income of each 
individual, Ym: 
[8] 
where Y m = wm(T-lm) + Ym• There are several studies of household resource allocations which examine the 
impact of male and female income on a variety of household demands (and outputs); for a review, see 
Blumberg, (l 988). Since each household member's utility depends on consumption of their own leisure, and 
possibly that of other members, it may be inappropriate in this model to assume labor supply, (T-lm), is 
exogenous and to thus treat total income as predetermined. Intuitively, household members are likely to 
negotiate over the consumption of goods and leisure simultaneously. 
Under the maintained assumption that current non-labor income is exogenous then it is unaffected by 
current demands and so is a valid instrument for total income. If, however, non-labor income reflects past labor 
supply behavior then it may not be exogenous; we experiment, therefore, with a range of identifying 
assumptions. Given a set of instruments, it is possible to determine whether the distribution of total income 
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within the household affects household demand patterns by testing for the equality of the impact of 
(instrumented) total income in the hands of different individuals in [8]. 
Testing for the equality of the effects of non-labor income on household decisions is not new although 
much ofthis literature has focussed on assignable goods and, in particular, leisure·demand. Using US data (the 
National Longitudinal Survey), McElroy and Horney (I 981) fail to reject the hypothesis that non-labor income 
accruing to the husband, wife and other members of the household have the same effect on male and female 
labor supply. In contrast, using household expenditure data from France and Canada, Bourguignon, Browning, 
Chiappori and Lechene ( 1991 , 1992) reject the model of common preferences. 
Using household expenditure data from Thailand, Schultz (I 990) demonstrates that a woman's non­
labor income has a significantly larger negative effect on the probability that she enters the wage labor force than 
does her husband's non-labor income. The reverse is true for men. He also examines the impact of non-wage 
income on fertility rates: more non-labor income in the hands of women tends to (significantly) raise fertility; 
it is little affected by husband's non-wage income. Schultz ( 1991) reports that in the United States non-labor 
income in the hands of a woman reduces the probability of being married (significantly for whites) and also 
reduces fertility (again, significantly only for whites). 
Thomas (1990) reports that in Brazil non-labor income in the hands of women, relative to men, has 
a bigger impact on a range of health inputs and outcomes ( child height, weight for height, survival and nutrient 
intake). Similar results are reported for child health (survival and immunizations) and schooling in Tamil Nadu, 
India by Duraisamy ( 1991 ). Quisumbing ( 1991) presents evidence for the Philippines in which assets under the 
control of men and women have differential impacts on resource flows to their children. 
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3. DATA 
The Estudo Nacional da Despesa Familiar, ENDEF, is a large scale household budget survey carried 
out by the /nstituto Brasilieri de Geografia e Estatistica from August 1974 through August 1975. Some 55 000 
households were included in a budget survey which, in addition to household expenditures, gathered information 
on mcome. Each member of the household was asked about their own labor supply, earnings and non-labor 
mcome. 
It is not obvious how to attribute income from family enterprises to individuals within the household; 
in this survey, all income was attributed to the 'household head'. This is particularly a problem in the rural 
sector where many families operate farms; in the urban sector, however, unpaid family workers account for less 
than 5% of all workers in the survey. The sample is therefore restricted to the 38,000 urban households in the 
survey and we focus on the incomes of the head and spouse; they will be referred to as the male and female 
heads. About 18 % of all the households in the survey are headed by single females whereas 6 % are headed 
by a single male. There are both a male and a female head in the remaining three quarters of households. 
On average, household income is about Cr$27 ,000 per month2 and, of that, three quarters is attributed 
to the male head. This share is very stable across the distribution of household per capita expenditure (PCE). 
Essentially every male head reports at least some income and the average male receives about Cr$28,000 per 
month. Just over 50% of female heads report some income and among these women, average monthly income 
is Cr$8,700 which is only one third of the average male income. 
About one quarter of total household income is derived from non-labor sources and positive non-labor 
income is reported by somewhat less than one half (43%) of all male heads and nearly a quarter (23%) of all 
female heads in the survey. On average, male heads report about Cr$6,5003 in non-labor income and it makes 
up about a quarter of their total income. The share of non-labor income in total income of men tends to rise 
with PCE. In contrast, for women, the share of income from non-labor sources is constant across the 
2Household income is defmed here as the income of the male and female heads. Other income is ignored
throughout. Inflation was approximately 35% per annum during the survey and so all incomes and expenditures
have been converted to real values using monthly deflators provided by IBGE. 
3Cr$5,302 divided by 0.81, the proportion of households with a male head. 
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distribution of PCE, accounting for about 40% of total income. The average female head reports about 
Cr$1, 700 in non-labor income. 
Income is notoriously difficult to measure well in.expenditure surveys. This may be because respondents 
do not wanf to report their income (for fear of reprisals)· or because the structure- of the survey instruments 
typically involves only a small number of questions on income but greater detail in expenditures. Whatever the 
reason, many of the recent studies of consumer behavior have used data only on expenditures. If income is hard 
to measure accurately, then it is quite likely that income from non-labor sources is even harder to capture. 
ENDEF, however, was a very comprehensive and intensive survey with each household being visited on 
a daily basis for a week by the same enumerator; there is some evidence that enumerators were able to elicit 
additional information later in the week as households came to view them as less alien (Vasconcellos, I 983). 
The survey took considerable care in the collection of income and, in particular, non-labor income which was 
broken down into six categories: income from rents and physical assets; financial assets; pensions; social security 
and workers compensation; gifts and other irregular income. Pension benefits and social security are likely to 
be related to previous labor supply choices and so we will also examine the impact of asset income on household 
commodity demands. While this may be a cleaner measure of non-labor income, we recognize that it, too, 
potentially reflects previous earnings and savings behavior. Indeed, this is a tough problem to crack, at least 
with a single cross-section of data. Even information on bequests or dowries as suggested by, for example, 
Schultz ( 1990) may not be predetermined in the context of these models of household behavioral choices. 
Among the survey respondents, 14% of men and 7% of women report any asset income. It thus 
accounts for a very small fraction (7%) of total household income, although among those who report any asset 
income, the amounts are certainly not trivial. We view experiments with the effects of asset income on 
commodity demand as checks on the robustness of the results based on the broader measure of non-labor 
mcome. 
The demand functions [3] depend not only on income and prices (which are discussed below) but also 
on a set of household characteristics, µ, such as household structure. Since we consider the demands of all 
households in the sample, controls for the presence of a male and female head are included. To pick up scale 
effects of demand, (the logarithm) of household size is added to the covariates and to permit variation in the 
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effects of different household compositions, µ includes the proportion of household members in each of five 
gender-specific age groups.4 
It is often argued that education of the male and.female heads are likely to affect tastes and thusshould 
also enter the demand functions. It might be. argued, however, that the impact of education operates only 
through income, in which case the education of the male and female heads provide a set of over-identifying 
instruments, in addition to non-labor income, in those models which include total income of the male and 
female head, [8]. Experiments with this specification are reported below. 
Each household in the survey reports both the value and quantity of goods consumed and so it is 
possible to compute a household specific price for each commodity that it purchases. Since variation in these 
prices may reflect measurement error and heterogeneity in quality choices, it is not appropriate to treat 
household levelprices as exogenous (Deaton, 1988). Instead, we include market average price indices for twelve 
commodity groups5as well as state and month controls to account for other unobserved heterogeneity in the 
community environment. 
It remains to specify the commodities in the demand system [4]. ENDEF reports expenditures on over 
300 different goods over a variable recall period ranging from a week for commonly consumed foods to a year 
for infrequently purchased goods such as durables and semi-durables. Since a large fraction of households do 
not purchase many of these goods, estimating demand functions at this level of disaggregation would entail 
addressing the auxiliary problem of the decision to purchase. (Lee and Pitt, 1983; Wales and Woodland, 1983; 
4The age groups are children aged 0-4, 5-9 and 10-14 years, adults (15-54) and older (than 55) household 
members. One group must be dropped ( older females) leaving 9 composition categories. 
· 
5lt is not obvious how to define market boundaries, at least from an· empirical perspective. Using prices on 135 
homogeneous commodities (such as black beans; mulatto beans; green corn; corn flour), median prices were 
computed for each of 23 states, distinguishing metropolitan from non-metropolitan areas. These median prices 
have then been aggregated into Tornquist price indices based on the shares of the budget spent on that good 
in each market: 
tnpGM = EgEG ½ (wgm + w&.) (tnpgm + tnpg.) 
where the g's are goods within the Gth commodity group, the •'s represent national averages and wgm is the 
share of expenditure on good g in market m. Price indices are included for 12 commodity groups: cereals, 
tubers, beans, fruit and vegetables, meat and fish, dairy products, fats, oils, housing, fuel and transport, clothing 
and personal care items. See Thomas, Strauss and Barbosa ( 1992) for details. 
see Deaton, 1986 for a discussion). We choose, therefore, to focus on a set of aggregates (and sub-aggregates) 
for which at least most households report non-zero expenditures. 
Housing expenditures are either ·reported by, or imputed for, all urban households in the survey and 
they account for· almost a fifth of the budget of the average household. Food, ,which is also purchased by 
virtually every household during the survey week accounts for 40% of the budget. According to the 
anthropological literature, in Brazil, women tend to have control over food in the home (Neuhauser, 1989); 
whether this carries over to food purchased outside of the home is not clear. We therefore examine its demand 
separately (although it is purchased by only 40% of households and accounts for about 4% of the budget). 
If adult clothing could be separated between men and women, then it may be an "assignable good" and 
thus used to identify the household income sharing rule: see Bourguignon, Browning, Chiappari and Lechene 
(1991, 1992) who examine the demand for these goods, amongst others. In ENDEF, however, it is not possible 
to unambiguously separate clothing expenditures along gender lines and so this strategy is not possible here. 
Alcohol, tobacco and clothing have traditionally been treated as "adult goods" in the equivalence scale literature 
and we have examined them both separately and as an aggregate. All our results for the aegree;ate c.arry through 
to the three commodities separately; in the interests of brevity we report only the aggregate case. 
There is some evidence that non-labor income in the hands of women in Brazil has a bigger impact on 
the health of children in the household than non-labor income in the hands of men. We therefore examine the 
demand for health services (including medical expenditures) and expenditures on education (including tuition 
payments, transport to school, school uniforms and items needed at school such as books). Household services 
(much of which is domestic services but also includes services for labor around the home and other services 
including telephone charges) are included with health and education as a 'human capital' aggregate. Almost all 
households purchase at least some of this commodity and it accounts for just under 7% of the budget of the 
average household. Each of these sub-aggregates is examined separately as well as together. 
Expenditures on books, magazines, clubs and other recreation items in addition to expenditures on 
ceremonies (birthdays, baptisms, weddings and funerals) are grouped together in the leisure aggregate which 
accounts for about 4% of the budget of the average household. The fmal category discussed below is household 
equipment which includes expenditures on linens, furniture, electrical equipment and other semi-durables. 
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Almost every household spends something on these goods and they account for nearly 8% of the total budget. 
The remaining I0% of the budget is accounted for by other commodities which are not reported here. 
Finally, it is straightforward to generalize the demand model above to include the consumption of not 
just foods but the nutrients they provide. Thus, we also examine the impact of income on the demand for 
calories and for protein. In ENDEF, total household consumption of nutrients was measured by weighing the 
food consumed at each meal (taking care to account for any wastage or left overs) over the course of a week. 
These data were then converted to nutrient intakes using PAO tables. Every person at each meal is reported 
and so per capita intakes of each nutrient are calculated for each household; see Haddad and Kanbur, ( 1990) 
for a recent study using individual nutrient intake information. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In order to determine whether re-distributing income within an household will affect household 
consumption patterns, we will test for the equality of the impact of male income, Im, and female income, Ir, on 
shares of the household budget allocated to a series of commodities, wi. Income effects arc allowed to be 
flexible with polynomials in both incomes, as well as an interaction term, included in the demand functions. 
Although only income effects are reported below, all regressions include controls, X, for the existence of a male 
and female head, their education, in household size and proportions of members in 9 age-gender groups, in 
prices, month dummies and state dummies. 
[9] 
The impact of non-labor income, (setting I = y), on household budget shares is reported in Tables 2 through 
4. The two stage least squares estimates using total individual income, (setting I=Y), and treating it as 
endogenous are reported in the remaining tables. All incomes are measured in millions of crusados. Sample 
summary statistics are in Appendix Table 1. 
According to Lagrange Multiplier tests (Breusch and Pagan, 1980), the assumption of homoskedastic 
errors is rejected in the regressions. All variance covariance matrices are estimated by the infinitesimal jackknife 
(Jaeckel, 1974; also called the influence function estimator, Hampel, 1974, and attributed to White, 1980) 
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which is consistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity. In very large samples, it probably makes sense to 
adopt a size of test which trades off Type I and Type II errors; we follow the proposal of Schwarz (197 8) which 
will asymptotically pick the model that is a posteriori most probable. For a x2 test statistic, the critical value 
is the logarithm of the sample size multiplied by the number of restrictions, r; for .. our sample, which has close 
to 39,000 observations, the critical value is I0.57*r. Since the square of at variate is asymptotically a Xf, the 
critical value of at statistic is 3.3 according to the Schwarz criterion. 
The impact of non-labor income (broadly defined) on demand is presented in Table 2; regression 
coefficients underlying the quadratic model are presented in Appendix Table 2. The left hand panel of Table 
2 reports coefficient estimates and quasi-t statistics for a model linear in male and female non-labor income 
(setting o:2, o:4 and o:5 to zero). The right hand panel reports the estimated income effects (evaluated at the 
mean) for the model [9];6 x2 statistics for joint significance of all three covariates are reported below each 
income effect. The third column of each panel reports the ratio of the female to male income effects and the 
x2 test for equality of these income effects (or, equivalently for the ratio of effects being equal to unity). Under 
the Schwarz criterion, the critical value for this test is l 0.6 in the linear model and 31.7 in the quadratic. model. 
The model which is linear in male and female income is rejected in most of the cases and the estimated 
income effects are substantially different from those based on the quadratic model [9]. The implications of the 
tests for equality of income effects are, however, quite similar in both the linear and quadratic models. 
Additional non-labor income in the hands of women increases the budget share spent on housing, education, 
household services, recreation and, possibly, health. More non-labor income in the hands of men raises the 
budget share spent on health, household services and leisure. For all these goods, however, the income effects 
are larger for women than men by a factor of between 3 and 5: the differences are significant for the human 
capital aggregate ( education, health and, in particular, household services) and also for the leisure aggregate 
(ceremonies and recreation). The household services sub-aggregate comprises largely of payments for domestic 
services, labor in the home and utilities such as telephones; these are likely to be substitutes for the time of the 
6Experiments with more flexible polynomial models indicated that cubic terms (and additional interactions) did 
not significantly improve the explanatory power of the regressions. 
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female head. Education and recreation expenditures might be viewed as investments in human capital and are 
directed mostly towards children; health expenditures may also be viewed as investments in human capital. 
Some shares must also decline and, it turns out that food shares (both at home and out of the home) 
as well as the share spent on adult goods7 decline with income (for both men and women)with the decline being 
larger for a marginal crusado in the hands of a woman: this difference is significant only for the food shares ( at 
home and away). Although food shares decline with income, food expenditures increase and, furthermore, the 
composition of food consumption also changes. As income ( of men or women) is increased, the per capita 
consumption of both calories and protein increases but the marginal effect of additional non-labor income in 
the hands of women is significantly larger than the impact of an increase in male income: for calories the income 
effects differ by a factor of 11 . Higher nutrient intakes are likely to be associated with better health ( at least 
in Brazil) and so these results suggest that women tend to allocate resources under their control towards foods 
which are associated with better health of household members. 
Taking the results together, there is some evidence that non-labor income in the hands of women rather 
than men seems to be associated with more expenditure on investments in human capital and also goods which 
are substitutes for the woman's own time. These results are consistent with other evidence, based on the same 
data, which indicates that non-labor income in the hands of women has a bigger ,effect on the health of her 
children than income in the hands of men. 
Not all estimated income effects differ between men and women. There is no evidence, for example, 
that rearranging the distribution of (non-labor) income within the household will have any (significant) impact 
on the shares spent on housing and household goods, both of which are presumably like 'public' goods to 
household members. In addition, estimated effects of income in the hands of men and women are essentially 
the same for those goods that are traditionally treated as adult goods, namely alcohol, tobacco and clothing 
(taken separately or taken together). 
Since a large fraction of the survey respondents report no non-labor income, it may be that the 
estimated income effects largely reflect heterogeneity between those who do have non-labor income and those 
7Experiments with male and female clothing (to the extent they can be identified in these data) did not indicate 
any significant differences in the impact of male or female nonlabor income on their expenditures. 
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who do not. Table 3 reports estimates based on the quadratic regression [9] in non-labor income, but includes, 
in addition, a pair of indicator functions for whether the male of female reports any non-labor income. 
Conditional on reporting some··non~Iabor income; the estimated income effects do not change dramatically and 
they are significantly different for men and women in the case of the human capital and leisure goods, food ~at 
home) and also per capita protein intake. 
As an additional check on the robustness of these results, non-labor income is defined to include only 
asset income in Table 4. Since fewer than 15% of households report any asset income, its effect on the 
demands for commodities that are not purchased by (almost) all households will be difficult to estimate: we 
focus, therefore, on the broader aggregates. It turns out that, qualitatively, the results are in line with those 
based on the broader definition of income: additional asset income in the hands of women rather than men is 
associated with larger budget shares on human capital and leisure goods, higher nutrient intakes and lower foods 
shares. These differences are, however, significant only for food (at home and away) although, perhaps, the 
differences in income effects on protein intake and human capital border on being significant. 
We also tested for differences in the impact on demand of asset and all other non-labor income (non­
asset income): their effects are, in general, not significantly different from each other and this is true both for 
men and for women. This implies that the differences in the effects of male and female income cannot be 
attributed to differences in the composition of non-labor income, to the extent that heterogeneity in composition 
is captured by this dichotomy. It is, however, possible that the differences in income effects reflect differences 
in measurement errors on male and female non-labor income. Although this is very difficult to rule out, there 
is evidence, using the same data source, that maternal non-labor income has a significant positive effect on the 
height (given age) of her daughter and no effect on her son, (Thomas, 199 I). This, along with the fact that 
maternal education has a bigger effect on the height of her daughter relative to her son, is suggestive that non­
labor income, and its distribution, is not pure noise. 
The focus thus far has been on non-labor income; would household consumption patterns change if total 
income were to be redistributed from men to women? Table 5 reports the results of estimating the demand 
functions [8] which are linear (left half) and quadratic (right half) in male and female total income; Appendix 
Table 2 presents the underlying coefficients for the quadratic model. The instruments include male and female 
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non-labor income, their quadratics and interactions; the model in the right hand panel of Table 5 is therefore 
exactly identified. 
Raising the mcome •of. women will tend to increase budget. shares on housing, education, . health, 
· household services and recreation;, if additional income is in the hands of men, then budget shares o.n ,health, 
household services and recreation will increase. As was the case with non-labor income, the budget shares rise 
more if additional income is put in the hands of women. Taken together, the estimated male and female income 
effects are different for both the human capital and leisure aggregates. 
Additional income has a negative impact on adult goods -- but the effect is the same independent of 
to whom the income is attributed. The share of the budget spent on food (at home and away) also declines with 
income but this decline is significantly greater if additional income is in the hands of women, rather than men. 
Per capita nutrient intakes rise with income at a much faster rate if the income is attributed to women rather 
than men: this difference is significant for both calorie and protein intakes. 
The results for total (labor and non-labor) income are, therefore, very similar to those that examine 
the impact of only non-labor income. Furthermore, the results for total income are also robust to the inclusion 
of a dummy for whether or not the individual reported any income (also treated as endogenous with dummies 
for reporting non-labor income as the instruments);, In the case of nutrients; however, female income effects• 
are significantly larger than male effects only for protein intake. (Table 6). Permitting more flexibility in the 
income responses (by including cubics in male and female income) does not change the thrust of these 
conclusions. 
All the demand functions have included dummies for the education of the male and female heads in 
order to control for heterogeneity in tastes. If household consumption is affected by education only through its 
impact on earnings and thus income, then education should be excluded from the demand functions and it is a 
valid instrument for total income. Estimates based on this model are presented in Table 7. Again, relative to 
men, income in the hands of women are associated with larger increases in the share of the budget spent on 
human capital goods and leisure and these differences are significant in all cases except housing. Nutrient 
intakes also rise faster if income is given to women and this difference is significant for both calories and protein. 
More income under the control of women is associated with higher shares on adult goods but lower shares if 
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the income is in the control of men: this difference is significant and this is the only instance of significantly 
different income effects on the demand for adult goods. Budget shares on food (at home and away) decline with 
income and this decline is significantly faster for women. 
Table 8 reports estimates of demand functions based on· sub-samples of the data. In the left hand 
panel, only those (29,373) households with both a male and female present are included in the analysis (cutting 
the sample by a quarter). The results are generally robust to this exclusion although only those income effects 
on human capital (especially household services) and food shares (in and out of the home) remain significantly 
different for men and women (under the Schwarz criterion). 
Restricting the sample to the (11,119) households in which both the male and female heads report some 
income, then differences in the effects of income in the hands of men and women tend to be smaller (and the 
ratios of income effects are closer to one). For most goods, this reflects (absolutely) larger effects of male 
income. In fact, income effects are not significantly different for any of the commodities except food eaten away 
from the home (which accounts for less than 5% of the total budget). These results do not, however, have an 
unambiguous interpretation, Sidestepping the issue of s;implr. selection and restricting attention to only those 
households in which both the male and female head report having some income, then this evidence suggests that 
modelling these households as if the head and spouse share· common preferences is consistent .with the data. ·· 
For all other households, however, the model of common preferences is apparently not appropriate. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
Most economic models treat the household as a black box: this paper has attempted to poke into that 
box by examining household commodity demand patterns. We have focussed on the impact of·income, 
distinguishing that attributed to women from that attributed to men. Under a model of (perfect) altruism (or 
common preferences of all household members), then the distribution of income within the household should 
have no impact on expenditure patterns. Using budget survey data from Brazil, this assumption has been tested 
both with non-labor income, which is assumed to be exogenous, and with total (labor and non-labor) income. 
It turns out that under both definitions, income in the hands of women is associated with a larger increase in 
the share of the household budget devoted to human capital (household services, health and education) and also 
leisure (recreation and ceremonies) goods. The proportion of the budget spent on food (at home and away) 
declines more if the income is in the hands of women although food composition also changes with nutrient 
intakes rising faster as womens' income increases. All these results are robust to a variety of specifications of 
the basic model. When the sample is restricted to only those couples in which both have some income, then 
there is little evidence that income in the hands of men and women have significantly different effects on 
commodity consumption. The results suggest that the key to understanding household resource allocation may 
lie in a better understanding of household composition patterns and labor supply decisions. 
18 
REFERENCES 
Altonji, J., F. Hayashi and L. Kotlikoff. 1989. Is the extended family altruisitically linked? Direct tests using 
micro data. NEER Working Paper 3046. 
Apps, P. 1982. Institutional inequality and tax incidence. Journal of Public Economics, l 8 :217-42. 
Ashworth, and D. Ulph. 1981. Household models, in C. V. Brown (ed.), Taxation and Labour Supply, London: 
Allen and Unwin. 
Becker, G. S. 1981. A Treatise on the Family, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Bjorn, P. A. and Q. H. Vuong. 1984. Simultaneous equations models for dummy endogenous variables: a game 
theoretic formulation with an application to labor force participation, working paper, California Institute 
of Technology. 
Bjorn, P.A. and Q. H. Vuong. 1985. Econometric modelling of a Stackelberg game with an application to labor 
force participation, working paper, California Institute of Technology. 
Blumberg, R. 1988., Income under female versus male control: Hypotheses from a theory of gender 
stratification and data from the Third World, Journal of Family Issues, 9.1 :51-84. 
Blundell, R. 1988. Consumer behaviour: Theory and empirical evidence -- A survey. Economic Journal, 98: I 6-
65. 
Bourguignon, F. 1984. Rationalite individuelle ou rationalite strategique: le cas de l'offre familiale de travail. 
Revue Economique, 35:147-62. 
Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, P. A. Chiappori and V. Lechene. 1991. Intrahousehold allocation of 
consumption: a model and some preliminary evidence. Mimeo, DELTA. 
Bourguignon, F., M. Browning, P.A. Chiappori, and V. Lechene. 1992. A structural empirical model of within 
household allocation. Mimeo, University of McMaster. 
Breusch T. S. and A. R. Pagan. 1980. The lagrange multiplier test and its applications to model specification 
in econometrics, Review ofEconomic Studies, 47:225-38. 
Chiappori, P. A. 1988a. Rational household labor supply, Econometrica 56. l :63-89. 
Chiappori, P. A. 1988b. Nash bargained household decisions, International Economic Review, 29.4:791-6. 
Chiappori, P.A. 1992a. Collective labour supply and welfare. Journal of Political Economy, 100.3:437-467. 
Chiappori, P. A. 1992b. Traditional versus Collective models of household behavior: What can data tell us? 
Mimeo, DELTA. 
Deaton, A. 1986. Demand Analysis. In Z. Griliches and M. D. Intriligator, eds., Handbook of Econometrics, 
Amsterdam:North Holland. 
Deaton, A. 1988. Quantity, quality and spatial variation of prices, American Economic Review, 78:418-30. 
Deaton, A. and J. Muellbauer. 1980. Economics and consumer behavior. New York:Cambridge University Press. 
19 
Deaton, A., J. Ruiz-Castillo and D. Thomas. 1989. The influence of household composition on household 
expenditure patterns: theory and Spanish evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 97. I :179-200. 
Duraisamy, P. 1991. Child survival, preventive health care and schooling in rural households of Tamil Nadu, 
India. Mimeo, Yale University. 
Haddad, Land R. Kanbur. 1990. How serious is the neglect of intra-household inequality? Economiclournal, 
I00:866-81. 
Hampel, F. 1974. The influence curve and its role in robust estimation. Journal of the American Statistical 
Association, 69:383-93. 
Horney, M. J. and M. B. McElroy. 1988. The household allocation problem: empirical results from a bargaining 
model, Research in Population Economics, 6:15-38. 
Jaeckel, L. A. 1972. Estimating regression coefficients by minimizing the dispersion of residuals, Annals of 
Mathematical Statistics, 42, 1020-1034. 
Kooreman, P. and A. Kapteyn. 1990. On the empirical implementation of some game theoretic models of 
household labor supply. Journal of Human Resources, 25.4584-595. 
Lee, L. F. and M. Pitt. 1986. Microeconometric demand systems with binding non-negativity constraints: The 
dual approach. Econometrica, 54.5:1237-42. 
Lundberg, S. and R. A. Pollak. 199 I. Separate spheres bargaining and the marriage market, mimeo. 
Manser, M. and M. Brown. 1980. Marriage and household decision making: a bargaining analysis, International 
Economic Review, 21.1:31-44. 
McElroy, M. B. 1990. The empirical content of Nash-bargained household behavior, Journal of Human 
Resources, 25.4:1-57. 
McEiroy, M. B. and M. J. Horney. 1981. Nash bargained household decisions, International Economic Review, 
22.2:333-50. 
McElroy, M. B. and M. J. Horney. 1988. Nash bargained household decisions: Reply, International Economic 
Review, 31.1 :237-42. 
Neuhouser, K. 1989. Sources of women's power and status among the urban poor in contemporary Brazil, 
Signs, 14.3 685-702. 
Pollak, R. and T. J. Wales. 1979. Welfare comparisons and equivalence scales. American Economic Review, 
69:216-21. 
Quisumbing, A. 1992. Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: gender differences in traditional 
inheritance customs. Forthcoming, Journal ofDevelopment Economics. 
Schultz, T. P. 1990. Testing the Neoclassical model of family labor supply and fertility, Journal of Human 
Resources, 25.4:599-634. 
Schultz, T. P. 1991. Economic aspects of marriage and fertility in the United States. Mimeo, Yale University. 
Schwarz, G. 1978. Estimating the dimension of a model. Annals of Statistics, 6:461-4. 
20 
Thomas, D., J. Strauss and M. Barbosa. 1992. Income and price elasticities of the demand for food, Pesquisa 
e Planejamento Economico. 
Thomas, D. 1990. Intra-household resource allocation: an inferential approach, Journal ofHuman Resources, 
25.4:635-664, Fall, 1990. 
Thomas, D.1991. Like father, like son or like mother, like daughter: Gender differences in household resource 
allocations. Mimeo, Yale University. 
Udry, C. 1990. Credit markets in Northern Nigeria: Credit as insurance in a rural economy. World Bank 
Economic Review, 4.3:251-270. 
Ulph, D. 1988. A general non-cooperative Nash model of household consumption behaviour. Mimeo, Bristol 
University. 
Vasconcellos, M. 1983. Objetivos, descricao e metodologia usada no ENDEF, Rio de Janeiro:IBGE. 
Wales, T. and A. Woodland. 1983. Estimation of consumer demand systems with binding non-negativity
constraints. Journal of Econometrics, 2 l :263-85. 




Distribution of income within the household
Total, labor and non-labor income: means and [standard errors] 
Mean % reporting Mean income
for all hhs income condit- conditional
ional on on reporting 
in hh some income 
Total income 27 006 98.3 27 467
[390] [396]
Labor income 20 097 84.7 23 715
[259] [302]
Non-labor income 6 909 52.5 6 909
[232] [302]
Asset income 1 883 14.8 12 722
[76] [500]
Non asset income 5 026 40.9 12 289
[189] [457] 
Male head 
% exist 81. 9 
Total income 23 020 81.1 99.0 28 407
[382] [465]
Labor income 17 718 73.1 89.2 24 239
[258] [338]
Non-labor income 5 302 35.3 43.1 15 029
[225] [629]
Asset income 1 300 11. 9 14.5 10 925
[74] [603]
Non asset income 4 002 28.7 35.0 13 924
[184] [629] 
Female head 
% exist 93.5 
Total income 3 986 45.9 49.1 8 676
[74] [154]
Labor income 2 379 33.5 35.8 7 111
[40] [110]
Non-labor income 1 606 21. 6 23.1 7 456
[59] [264]
Asset income 531 6.6 7.0 8 045
[20] [638]




Effects of male and female income on commodity demand: 
Non-labor income 
Linear model Quadratic model 
Female Male Ratio 
(evaluated at mean) 
Female Male Ratio 
Shares 
Food -107.67 -21. 06 5.11 -246.08 -60.06 4.10 
[4.73] [2.85) [12. 96 J [305.39] [128.30] [143.78] 
Meals out -25.41 -2.55 9.98 -63.44 -7.82 8.12 
[4.29] [2.55) [14.38] [105.85] [50.95] [74.03) 
Housing 26.62 4.83 5.51 72.43 12. 77 5.67 
[2.60] [2.79] [4.39] [32.50] [14.28] [21. 79] 
Human capital 41. 88 5.85 7.16 86.79 18.25 4.76 
[4.56] [2.53] [14.40) [146.65] [78.20] [103.84] 
Education 7.75 0. 96 8.03 18.45 2. 92 6.31 
[3.63) [1. 71] [9.37] [36. 72] [9.06] [22.32] 
Health 13. 72 1. 55 8.83 22.29 6.44 3.46 
[2.88] [1.57] [6.20] [29.51] [36.53] [23.49] 
HH Services 20.42 3.33 6.13 46.05 8.89 5.18 
[4.33] [3.24] [12.47] [145.47] [75.10] [85.49] 
Leisure 31. so 6.63 4.75 58.58 16.06 3.65 
[4.47] [2.98] [11. 25) [58. 71] [64.61] [40.60] 
Ceremonies 7.90 -0.11 -69.65 19.80 0. 71 27.90 
[2.96] [0.40] [8.94] [28.44] [11. 80] [26.11] 
Recreation 23.60 6.74 3.50 38.79 15.35 2.53 
[3.90] [3.29] [6.85] [37.75] [63.64] [28.94] 
HH Goods 5.85 0.21 27.68 12.22 1. 86 6.56 
[2.03] [0.27] [3.53] [7.56] [7.55] [6.08] 
Adult goods -14.42 -4.51 3.19 -17.57 -11.21 1. 57 
[5.71] [3.36] [11. 86) [29.23] [38.59] [1. 90 l 
Nutrient intakes 
,en(calories 1. 63 0.16 10.35 1. 60 0.14 11.08 
per capita) [2.47] [2.10] [19.28] [69.64] [16 .13 l [52.88] 
,en(protein 3.47 0.54 6.37 3.47 0.59 5.91 
per capita [3.21] [2.67] [49.52] [207.85] [72.83] [119.47] 
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Notes 
1. There are 38,799 observations in the sample. In addition to income, each regression includes controls 
for the existence of a male and female head, their education (three dummies each - literate, completed
elementary school and completed secondary school or more), tn household size and proportions of members 
in 9 age-gender groups, tn prices; month dummies and state dummies. All incomes are measured in ·· 
millions of crusados. 
2. Human capital goods are education, health and household services. Education includes tuition, uniforms 
and other schooling expenses. Health includes medications, prescriptions, medical care expenses. Household 
services include domestice services, labor around the home and utlities such as telephones. 
Leisure expenditures include those on ceremonies (baptisms, birthdays, weddings) and recreation (books,
magaszines, clubs and sports fees). 
Household goods are linens, furniture and other household semi-durables. 
Adult goods are alcohol, tobacco and clothing and footwear. 
3. Income effects for females and males reported for each commodity; [t statistics] below estimates in linear 
models; x2 tests for joint significance of income covariates below estimates in non-linear models. Ratio of 
female to male income effects in third column; x2 for equality of male and female effects in parentheses
below ratio. 
4. All tests based on heteroskedasticity consistent estimates of standard errors. 




Effects of quadratics in non-labor income on commmodity demand:
including dummy(l) if report any non-labor income 
Female Male Ratio x2(incl dummy) 
Shares 
Food -234.10 -48.45 4.85
[379.73] [658.75] [147.11] [160.59] 
Meals out -46.66 -4.57 10.20
[182.06] [121.15] [54.61] [70.01] 
Housing 73.26 10.53 6.95
[32.88] [42.45] [21.68] [24.39] 
Human capital 84. 71 14.81 5. 72
[161.07] [260.83] [100.30] [111.99] 
Education 18.62 1. 94 9.60
[36.88] [64.27] [24.02] [35.44] 
Health 20.30 4.81 4.25
[36.25] [99.94] [21.43] [25.90] 
HH Services 45.79 8.07 5.69
[154.68] [1~4.05] [82.56) [83.36] 
Leisure 54.79 13. 70 4.00
[99.60] [185.11] [37.05] [37.87] 
Ceremonies 17.60 0.18 98.94
[43.73] [30.40] [20.93] [23.86] 
Recreation 37.19 13. 52 2.75
[62.88] [200.23] [27.60] [34.56] 
HH Goods 5.74 0.22 25.61
[43.73] [30.37] [4.62] [5.27] 
Adult goods -23. 72 -11. 05 2.15
[42.45] [38.79] [5.66] [12.06] 
Nutrient intakes 
in(calories per cap) 1.43 0.08 17.75
[28.76] [13 .64] [14.12] [11.41] 
in(protein per cap) 3.39 0.51 6.62
[78.75] [39.78] [66.98] [53.59] 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Effects of male and female total income on commodity demand: 
2SLS : Instruments-non-labor income 
Linear model Quadratic model 
(evaluated at mean) 
Female Male Ratio Female Male Ratio 
Shares 
Food -105.95 -19.39 5.46 -261.10 -66.90 3.90 
[4.85] [3.69] [14.85] [269.45] [61. 31] [115.95] 
Meals out -24.91 -2.38 10.47 -66.63 -9.22 7.23 
[4.36] [3.12] [15.29] [126.04] [45.30] [90.29] 
Housing 26.42 4. 36 6.06 76.10 13. 79 5.52 
[2.63] [2. 96] [4. 72] [31.89] [10.83] [21.60] 
Human capital 41.12 5.51 7.46 91. 69 21.01 4.36 
[4.64] [3.16] [15.55] [64.87] [4.14] [30.06] 
Education 7.60 0.90 8.45 19.44 3.39 5.74 
[3.66] [2.00] [9.95] [36.34] [9.55] [22.84] 
Health 13.39 1. 59 8.41 23.89 7.94 3.01 
[2.87] [2.11] [6.23] [30.08] [36.59] [25.00] 
HH Services 20.14 3.02 6.67 48.45 9. 72 4.98 
[4.42] [3. 72] [13. 73] [143.16] [47.19] [93.51] 
Leisure 30.87 5.90 5.24 62.20 17.10 3.64 
[4.58] [3.69] [13.06] [61.23] [41.99] [45. 72] 
Ceremonies 7. 71 -0.03 -270.92 20.66 1. 31 15.76 
[2.97] [0.11] [8.86] [29.48] [14.63] [26.75] 
Recreation 23.16 5.92 3 .91 41.55 15.79 2.63 
[3.98] [3.94] [8.25] [37.93] [35.53] [29.09] 
HH Goods 5.56 0.29 19.12 13 .15 2.74 4.80 
[l. 97] [0.43] [3.29] [7. 71] [7.63] [6.31] 
Adult goods -14.39 -4.04 3.56 -18. 77 -11. so 1. 63 
[5. 71] [3. 72] [14.22] [31.49] [26.81] [2.25] 
Nutrient intakes 
in(calories 1. 63 0.16 10.35 1. 68 0.18 9.40 
per cap) [2.45] [1. 94] [32.10] [69.57] [17.68] [53.44] 
in(protein 3.47 6.54 6.37 3.66 0.69 5.32 
per cap [2.32] [2.08] [51. 74] [201. 22 l [66.88] [130.19] 
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 6
Effects of male and female total income on commodity demand:
2SLS : Instruments-non-labor income and education 
Quadratic model
(evaluated at mean)
Female Male Ratio 
Shares 
Food -445.74 -192.91 2.31
[246.44] [64.54] [49.70] 
Meals out -76.64 -16.69 4.59
(173.00] (112.34] [89.69] 
Housing 101.80 36. 77 2. 77
[63.32] [43.69] [27.58] 
Human capital 161.48 63.99 2.52
(237.35] (61.82] [89.34] 
Education 46.23 21. 64 2.14
(135 .44] (54.70] [48.19] 
Health 34.59 13.66 2.53
(65.30] [67.70] (35.27] 
HH Services 80.65 28.69 2.81
[264.48] [56.74] (97.61] 
Leisure 80.56 36 .11 2.23
[119.01] (109.87] [54.16] 
Ceremonies 25.12 6.38 3.94
[61.99] [40.59] [42.49] 
Recreation 55.45 29.74 1. 86
[77. 54 l [127.72] [36.39] 
HH Goods 23.02 8.98 2.56
[19.36] [33.80] [10.07] 
Adult goods 15.12 -4.00 -3.78
(58.41] [27.89] (36.73] 
Nutrient intakes
ln(calories per cap) 2.44 0.67 3.66
(152.64] (62.12] [84.83] 
ln(protein per cap) 5.64 1. 95 2.90
(256.30] [64.78] (78.61] 
Notes: See Table 2 
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Table 7
Effects of male and female total income on commodity demand:
including dummy(l) if report any income
2SLS : Instruments-non-labor income 
Female Male Ratio x2(incl dummy) 
Shares
Food -351.81 -75.63 4.65
[386.92] [354.88] [101.07] [109.52] 
Meals out -72.27 -13.76 5.25
[162.36] [137.70] [47. 72] [74.34] 
Housing 94.32 15.25 6.18
[52.10] [27.19] [27.10] [27.10] 
Human capital 118.82 23.33 5.09
[231.63] [181.12] [107.95] [116.25] 
Education 29.21 3. 96 7.38
[84.87] [40.85] [45.43] [45.52] 
Health 33.98 9.16 3. 71
[77.63] [90.96] [28.78] [47.85] 
HH Services 55.63 10.21 5.45
[182.52] [113.72] [103.79] [103.82] 
Leisure 78.12 19.08 4.10
[151.22] [151.59] [53.93] [69.54] 
Ceremonies 23.26 1. 94 12.00
[45.04] [24.90] [29.45] [29.49] 
Recreation 54.86 17.14 3.20
[121.83] [160.80] [36.87] [60.42] 
HH Goods 18.53 4. 72 3.93
[43.79] [41.07] [7.92] [24.76] 
Adult goods -15.90 -11.01 1.44
[30.70] [26.20] [0.78] [4.83] 
Nutrient intakes
ln(calories 1. 62 0.14 11.22
per capita) [33.15] [14.59] [16.52] [17.79] 
ln(protein 3.66 0.64 5.73
per capita) [82.25] [40.52] [46.08] [38.31] 
Note: See Table 2. 
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Table 8 
Restricted samples: effects of income on commodity demand: 
2SLS : Instruments-non-labor income 
HHs with intact couples as Both male and female head 
male and female head report some income 
Female Male Ratio Female Male Ratio 
Shares 
Food -188.35 -65.05 2.90 -210.35 -127.15 1. 65 
[99.39) [60.11] [36.52] [61.68] [198.11] [11.20] 
Meals out -20.43 -7.60 2.69 -37.77 -20.85 1. 81 
[22.37] [35.77) [36.94) [39.09] [35.87] (49.16) 
Housing 80.76 13.66 5.91 133 .14 25.46 5.23 
[12.02] [10.95] [7.40] [22.40] [15.87] [22.07] 
Human capital 86.76 4. 2520.41 88.52 42.15 2.10 
[34.90) [30.10] [30.09] [31.57] [49.63] (6.54] 
Education 4.61 3.48 1. 33 2.10 4. 71 0.44 
[14.01) [6.74) [8.79] [14.75] [7.38] [8.93] 
Health 22.54 8.02 2.81 22.60 19.35 1.17 
[11.85) [23.46) [18.90] [13.73] [20.04] [17.01] 
HH Services 59.61 8.91 6.69 63.83 18.09 3.53 
[57.43) [28.95) [40.70] [39.38] [43. 71] [15. 71 l 
Leisure 48.65 3.0316.05 46.40 37.83 1. 23 
[18.81) [24.15) [22.35] [16.24] [34.82] [6.09] 
Ceremonies 20.24 1.14 17.79 25.03 2.55 9.80 
[6.38) [9.16) [6.78] [3.83] [2.84] [2.58] 
Recreation 28.41 14.92 1. 90 21. 37 35.28 0.61 
[17.39) [26.52) [21.35] (13.99] [41.66] [6.51] 
HH Goods -10.15 3.30 -3.07 -26.18 2.86 -9.15 
[8. 71) [3.86] [9.03] (9.38] [1.16] [6.11] 
Adult goods -39.14 -10.51 3. 72 -61. 24 -27.11 2.26 
[15.24) [20.40) [5.05] (14.75] [23.80] [4.36] 
Nutrient intakes 
ln(calories 0.78 0.19 4.13 1.10 0.42 2.59 
per capita) [2.15] [l. 04 l [15.56] [6.52) [8.93) [3.49] 
ln(protein 2.48 0.68 3.67 3.65 1.16 3.14 
per capita [2.31] [0.90] [20.21] (37.45] [39.73] [10.71] 
Note: See Table 2. 29,273 households in sample of intact couples; critical 
value of x2 for equality of effects is 30.9. 11,119 households in 
sample of income recipients; critical value of x2 is 27.9 
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Appendix Table 1
Means and standard errors of covariates 
Mean Std. err. %>0 
Expenditure shares 
food 40.88 0.0902 98
meals out 4.24 0.0477 41 
housing 18.53 0.0613 100 
human capital 6. 77 0.0348 94
education 1. 89 0.0162 62
health and medical 3.43 0.0245 84
hh services 1. 45 0.0145 60 
leisure 3.93 0.0286 81
ceremonies 1. 49 0.0172 56
recreation 2.44 0.0217 71 
hh goods 7.79 0.0374 99 
adult goods 13.10 0.0440 99 
log(calorie intake) 7.61 0.0014
log(protein intake) 6.44 0.0018 
Household characteristics
Male head 
(1) exists 0.818 0.0019
(1) literate 0.36 0.0024
(1) complete elem educ 0.20 0.0020
(1) complete second educ 0.15 0.0017 
Female head 
(1) exists 0.935 0,001?.
(1) literate 0.39 0.0024
(1) complete elem educ 0.22 0.0020
(1) complete second educ 0.13 0.0017 
Household composition 
log(hhsize) 1. 38 0.0030
# males aged 0-4/hh size 0.059 0.0005
# females aged 0-4/hh size 0.057 0.0005
# males aged 5-9/hh size 0.051 0.0005
# females aged 5-9/hh size 0.051 0.0005
# males aged 10-14/hh size 0.049 0.0005
# females aged 10-14/hh size 0.050 0.0005
# males aged 15-54/hh size 0.262 0.0010
# females aged 15-54/hh size 0.291 0.0010
# males aged ge 55/hh size 0.052 0.0007
# males aged ge 55/hh size 0.129 0.0010 
Coomunity characteristics ln(prices)
price agg for cereals 0.057 0.0006
price agg for tubers 0.025 0.0011
price agg for sugar -0.055 0.0005
price agg for bean 0.042 0.0008
price agg for fruit & veges 0.024 0.0009
price agg for meat & fish 0.043 0.0002
price agg for dairy -0.001 0.0003
price agg for fats -0.015 0.0002
price agg for oils -0.017 0.0004
price agg for housing 0.683 0.0029
price agg for fuel/transport -0.050 0.0008
price agg for clothing 0.173 0.0007
price agg for clean/p_care 0.020 0.0005 
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Appendix Table 2 
Estimated coefficients on income in OLS and 2SLS regressions 
















































































































































2SLS estimates: instruments= non-labor 
Food -270.02 [19.06] 289.62 (46.50] 
Meals out -68.75 (6. 61] 78.33 (12.80] 
Housing 77. 80 (13.96] -94.99 (21.65] 
Human capital 94.83 (12.86] -93.91 [24.14] 
Education 20.08 [3.53] -22.15 (5.80] 
Health 24.93 (5. 38] -18.42 (9.88] 
HH Services 49.82 (4. 39] -53.34 [7.36] 
Leisure 64. 77 [8. 79] -56.98 [ 13. 41] 
Ceremonies 21. 30 (3.99] -24.31 [5.02] 
Recreation 43.47 [7.74] -32.66 [11. 70] 
HH Goods 14.12 [6. 45] -13 .11 (9. 51] 












































































2SLS estimates: instruments= total income 
Food -465.93 (33. 91] 522.37 (83.94] 
Meals out -79.56 [6.50] 91.10 [13.54] 
Housing 105.43 [13.43] -127.88 [24. 39] 
Human capital 168.25 [12.23] -181.24 (23.74] 
Education 48.33 (4.90] -55.80 (10.75] 
Health 36.35 (4.90] -31. 92 (8.87] 
HH Services 83.58 [6.06] -93.51 [13.43] 
Leisure 84. 50 (8. 41] -80.61 [15.36] 
Ceremonies 26.14 [3.54] -30 .11 (4.98] 
Recreation 58.35 [7.19] -50.50 (12.82] 
HH Goods 24.75 [6.19] -25.64 [10.09] 





































































[ 9. 47] 
(21. 58] 
(25.95] 
[16.54] 
